million.2 Despite the topographical disadvantages of a mountainous country, a short growing season, the massive destruction inflicted during the Korean War , and decades of economic blockade, North Korea reported a record in 1984 in grain production-8 million tons3-that far exceeded the consumption requirements of a population that had doubled from 10 million to 22 million. Given these production constraints, how was North Korea able to meet its growing consumption requirements for several decades before plunging into a near-total collapse in production? A short answer is its industrial model of agriculture.
In tracing North Korea's grain production, I have used what credible sources were available. Figure 1 illustrates the rise and demise of North Korea's cereal production. Cereal yields grew rapidly over the two decades from 1960 to 1980, from slightly over 3 million tons to over 7 million tons.4 Grain production reached its height four years later, rapidly increasing to 8 million tons in 1984.5 However, a precipitous drop in grain productiondown to 6.74 million tons-came a few years later. In 1993, a year before the well publicized adverse weather that impacted cereal production, North Korea's production had already fallen to 5.44 million tons.6 This decrease reflects a decline of overall cereal production by some 20 percent between 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) . The 1995 report contained information for 1989, 1993, and 1995. 1989 and 1993, As this article's analyses show, it seems likely that the decline resulted not from poor conditions, but instead from structural problems in North Korea's agricultural industry. These problems predated the advent of serious natural calamities. Controlling for the climatic setbacks of 1995, grain yields would likely have been some 3.1 million tons for paddy rice and 2.7 million for maize.7 The point is that although crops were affected by extreme variations in climatic conditions, yields declined by substantially more than these conditions can explain. Conventional explanations attribute North Korea's agricultural collapse to overall economic decline, the deficiencies of the socialist collective system, or environmental disaster, and view the nation as an idiosyncratic failure. By analyzing not just the crisis of the collapse but also the processes involved in the rise and demise of modern, industrial agriculture in North Korea, this article presents a different viewpoint. Rather, I argue that North Korea's agricultural crisis stems from the unsustainable practices of modern industrial agriculture. North Korea owed its three decades of impressive agricultural success to industrial and technological interventions. However, these methods created not only an increasing need for synthetic inputs but also dangerous levels of physical and environmental externalities. North Korea paid for its early success with the collapse of the 1990s. Ironically, the same set of factors drove both the success and the collapse.
From the outset, it is important to note that data assessment and interpretation still remain major challenges in studying North Korean agriculture, notwithstanding the last twelve years since the famine in 1995-96, which necessitated greater provision ofinformation to secure international humanitarian aid. These difficulties arise both from within North Korea, where data is sporadic and idiosyncratic, as well as from outside North Korea, where the West politicizes information about the country. Ideological skirmishes about the validity and reliability of information continue, but some progress has been made since the humanitarian crisis in the mid-1990s. There now exist greater opportunities for United Nations (UN) agencies and others involved in relief efforts to obtain additional, independently verifiable empirical data-both quantitative and qualitative-about agriculture. Since this article examines the historical development of North Korean agriculture and its relation to the current agricultural crisis, I
utilize both North Korean and international data to illustrate this trend.
THREE ARGUMENTS ON THE CAUSE OF NORTH KOREA'S AGRICULTURAL COLLAPSE
The literature on the North Korean food and agricultural crisis tends to emphasize three causes: economic decline, the organizational/institutional 78Chong-Ae Yu deficiencies of the socialist collective system, and environmental factors. The debate over these causes typically takes place within the confines of seeking the causal factors of the famine and food crisis rather than understanding the collapse of the agricultural system itself. Although each of these arguments partially explains the agricultural crisis, none provides a causal explanation of what precipitated the collapse of the agricultural production system. I present the key points of each argument in the sections that follow.
The "General Economic Decline" Argument Although opinion varies on the cause of North Korea's economic decline, proponents of this argument share the view that despite North Korea's claim of being self-reliant and independent, it was not free from the constraints of the world economy.8 North Korea relied heavily on the former Soviet Union (Russia) and on China for trade and technical assistance in key sectors. Once the socialist bloc began to disintegrate in 1989, North Korea lost assistance and preferential-trade treatment from Russia and China. Consequently, North Korea's ability to import the critical inputs-such as the crude oil, petroleum products, coking coal, and machine parts that were essential to the operation of its industrial sector-was drastically reduced, which in turn severely strained the country's industrial sector. North Korea's modern agriculture depended heavily on its industrial sector for agro-inputs, as well as on imported fuel and petroleum products, which meant that the agricultural decline occurred alongside a general economic contraction.9 Scholars who support this argument attribute North Korea's inability to sustain its agricultural production system either to shrinkage in macroeconomic conditions-that is, the dissolution of the socialist system-or to the deterioration of North Korea's industrial sector.
This argument presupposes that if needed inputs were provided, agricultural production would recover to its previous levels. Such a recovery, however, is unlikely given the state of soil fertility and environmental degradation in North Korea, the unpredictable global ecological impacts yet to be manifested, and the social changes that have occurred in North Korea as a result of the agricultural crisis during the last decade.
The Organizational/Institutional Argument
The organizational/institutional argument focuses on inherent deficiencies of the socialist collective farming system as the primary cause of agricultural collapse: the overcentralization of decision-making in agricultural management and practices, the influence of an extensive and inflexible state bureaucracy on The Rise and Demise ofIndustrial Agriculture in North Korea79 economic and social life, and the absence of farmer incentives as a result of the collective farming system.10
The oft-cited examples in this line of argument are the practice oíjuche (chuch'e, self-reliance) farming methods,11 and the issue of common property ownership. Critics oíjuche farming methods argue that such methods are based on political reasoning, not on agricultural sciences,12 with farmers being forced to implement the methods of a rigid political system. North Korea counters the critics by contending that juche methods are, in fact, based on agricultural sciences intended to raise land productivity through intensive crop production management. Though diametrically opposed, both the argument and counterargument point to the assumed framework of industrial agriculture in North Korea. Alternatively, I would argue that the failure oíjuche methods points to the insolvency of the existing industrial agricultural system rather than the methods it implements, whether it is politically motivated or scientifically based.
The proponents of the organizational/institutional argument postulate that a lack of private property ownership and farmer incentive prevents farmers from making an investment in agriculture, since under the collective system, farmers are de facto state-employed agricultural workers. As such, they comply with government plans for production at a minimal level. Furthermore, bureaucratic intervention is exogenous to any successful management of the farm organization, and because ofthis bureaucratic imperative, together with the individual farmer's inability to make any decisions on his or her own, farmers have no incentives to outperform. 13 However, if one supposes that overcentralization of decision-making and lack of farmer incentive in North Korea are the main causes of production decline in the 1990s, how does one explain the fact that, for many decades, North Korea achieved impressive increases in agricultural production with little change to incentives or planning systems? In reality, agriculture in North Korea has been decentralized to county-level since the mid-1960s, consisting of a primary production unit (subwork team) of fifteen to twentyfive people permanently assigned to a given area of land and implements.14 In the mid-1980s, the subwork team was even more decentralized, comprising fewer than seven or eight people. For much oftheir lives, many of the farmers stayed in a small subwork team unit, often made up of their own relatives. Certainly, the organizational/institutional line of argument provides insights into the shortcomings of the collective structure and planned economy, but it does not explain how the system functioned reasonably well for half a century with very little change. This line of argument frequently offers family farming and the free-market solution (privatization) as silver bullets, yet experiences in transition economies tell a different story. Would "the market" 80Chong-Ae Yu bring back sustainable agriculture and safe food production, and undo the damages done by fifty years of industrial agriculture?
The Environmental Argument
The last ofthe three arguments examined here rests within the existing literature as a secondary factor contributing to North Korea's agricultural decline. 15 The North Korean government cited a variant of this argument, emphasizing "natural disaster" as the cause, when it first approached the international community for humanitarian assistance in September 1995. In turn, many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies invoked this "natural disaster" explanation as justification for providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea in 1995 Korea in , 1996 Korea in , and 1997 out of political convenience. To be sure, the series ofnatural calamities that afflicted North Korea in the later half of the 1990s had a devastating impact on food production and agricultural land, notably the floods in 1995 and 1996, and droughts and a tidal wave in 1997 and again in 2000-2001. Unlike other scholars, Meredith Woo-Cumings identifies these negative ecological impacts as one of the primary factors underlying the agricultural crisis and ensuing famine in North Korea. Woo-Cumings posits that a series of ecological disasters throughout the world negatively affected fragile economies in the last three decades. In the 1990s, North Korea was at the epicenter of a global ecological disaster that explains the extent to which its agricultural production dropped. 17 Certainly, the natural calamities that occurred over several years during the mid-1990s contributed to further environmental degradation and a decline in food production. The environmental argument explains both the extent ofthe degradation to North Korea's agricultural land and highlights the 1995 and 1996 disasters as local manifestations of global ecological havoc. Together, these forces may have tipped the balance ofNorth Korea's agricultural condition during this period.
Notably, the environmental argument accounts for neither the 1980s agricultural decline before the floods of the mid-1990s, nor the continued depressed production in the absence of calamities in the years since. It is more likely that years of input-intensive national food production policy had already seriously degraded the arable land in North Korea.
In contrast to the three conventional explanations just discussed, each of which characterizes the North Korean agricultural collapse as an idiosyncratic failure, this article shows that North Korea's agricultural crisis can be attributed to the unsustainable nature ofmodern industrial agriculture, which in turn has been rooted in a thoroughgoing implementation of the worldwide modernization project of the past century. While North Korean agriculture is now considered to be an utter failure, its present crisis must be understood in relation not only to the country's postcolonial development, but also to the feverish global drive for industrial agriculture as the dominant model for food production. This model of agriculture is based on the concentration and centralization of land and capital that accompany large-scale monoculture farming, which is both machine-and chemicalintensive, requiring large inputs of energy and specialization in high-yielding hybrid crops. Soon after North Korea was established in 1945,18 it embarked on a modernization project that fundamentally transformed its society from agrarian to industrial, with the aim of achieving food self-sufficiency.
A postcolonial society, North Korea was an emerging socialist state when, early on, it experienced the intervention of two imposing superpowers: the Soviet Union, politically, and the United States, militarily. North Korea's emphasis on food self-sufficiency as a cornerstone of its national development policy came after the Korean War. The country's perception ofagriculture as a basis for its "national security" was apparently forged from the devastation of its countryside and agricultural base wrought by two forces-blanket bombing by the United States, and the continuing division ofthe Korean peninsula with the accompanying threat of Cold War-era military hostilities-during the Korean War. North Korea believed that without a secure food supply it would be vulnerable to foreign domination and military aggression.19 Although the country's physical resource base severely limited its ability to become agriculturally self-sufficient, doubling and tripling the agricultural production rate seemed possible with the aid of modern science and technology. In the 1950s, the Green Revolution's promises of increased food production already held sway in many parts of the world, and North Korea latched onto the idea of science-based agricultural development as a way to move forward.
North Korea was committed to modernizing the rural area through technological innovation and socialist socialization. The socioeconomic process that took place not only "upgraded" agricultural technology, but also socialized the peasantry into becoming socialist farmers as the state gradually consolidated private ownership into common property ownership. Modernizing agriculture showed the state's attitude toward development in general: the modernization of the farm sector was synonymous with industrialization, and industrialization was viewed as the silver bullet to North Korea's overall developmental challenges. The technological intervention was a social and political project, not just an economic and technological solution to develop rural productive forces. To give a sense of how extensive and rapid the agricultural industrialization process has been, the next section briefly outlines the main components of the development of industrial agriculture in North Korea.
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Rescaling the Land In 1943, two years prior to the liberation from Japanese colonization, 44.2 percent of North Korean peasants were landless, involved in tenant farming or employed as farm labor. If part-tenants (defined as peasants who had some land of their own and rented the rest) were included in the calculation, the rate of tenancy was 75 percent, with most farms less than 1 hectare, and only 4 percent of the farms larger than 5 hectares.20 This meant that three of four farm households were either landless or perilously close to being landless, with too small a plot to adequately sustain a farm family after rent was taken out. Against this backdrop, in March 1946, less than a year after independence, North Korea initiated the first of several land reforms that eventually led to the total collectivization of its rural communities, in which nearly one million hectares of confiscated land were redistributed to 724,522 households, with less than 2 percent under state ownership.21 Each household received an average of 1.33 hectares of arable land; the redistribution benefited more than 70 percent of the rural population, or about 50 percent of the total population ofNorth Korea at the time, and covered more than 50 percent of the cultivable acreage.22
Following the cessation of the Korean War, North Korea instituted another round of agrarian reform. This time, the changes affected not only landownership, but also the way in which rural communities were organized and administered. From 1954 to 1958, the country's farm households were transformed into cooperative farms through three phases of "cooperativization," which gradually led to full collectivization on a "voluntary" basis over the five-year period. There were state-supported inducements for those communities that became "socialist cooperatives." These phases were not so clear-cut, however, and all three types existed over the five years until 1958, when the collectivization process was completed and the entire rural population came under cooperative management except for a small population ofagricultural workers employed by the state farms. Nevertheless, each farm household was allowed to keep a small garden plot (these "kitchen gardens" were around 30 p'yöng, or 100 square meters) and fruit trees, and to raise small domestic livestock for family consumption and sale at the farmers' market.23 The "phase-in" and "voluntary" strategies seemed to minimize potential resistance as well as to prepare peasants for a smoother transition into collectivization. The historical timing might also have worked to the state's advantage in the transition from private ownership to cooperative ownership. North Korea experienced high casualties and population migration to South Korea during the war, contributing to labor shortages in the rural areas. This situation, together with limited production tools and available draught animals for individual farming
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As collectivization progressed, the size and scale of cooperatives grew. In 1953 the average size of a cooperative was 14.7 households, and the average size of a farm around 13.6 hectares. The following year, the number ofhouseholds per cooperative doubled to 32.9, with the corresponding landholdings quadrupling. The trend of the increases in both cooperative size and landholdings continued until 1957. In its final year, the collectivization process redistricted the basic, local administrative unit of ri (the smallest administrative unit in North Korea's rural areas, comparable to a township in the United States) to include all cooperatives within a ri, and this resulted in enlarging the average size of a farm from 105 hectares to 466 hectares. Table 1 shows this consolidation process from 1953 to 1958. One of the main reasons for the consolidation appears to be to create large-scale farming, with a view to "speed up the technical revolution"24 that the government believed to be the most advantageous for socialist construction. To the present day, cooperative farms have remained the dominant form of farm and rural organization in North Korea, whereby everything-including land, farm facilities, and implements-is owned collectively by cooperative members, who are paid incomes in shares of what they produce.
Technological Intervention
North Korea's total land area is about 12.3 million hectares, of which 75 percent is mountainous and unsuitable for agriculture. Of the remaining land area, about 16.4 percent (1.99 million hectares) is arable.25 The limited potential for enlarging domestic food production through field expansion led North Korea to adopt a strategy of agriculture intensification through irrigation, mechanization, the intensive use of agro-chemicals, and the development of hybrid seeds, buttressed by full rural electrification.
In 1964 the North Korean government adopted a watershed policy, detailed in Theses on the Socialist Rural Questions in Our Country, a document that President Kim Il Sung (Kim Ilsöng) forwarded to the Eighth Plenary Meeting of the Fourth Central Committee of the Workers' Party, and which was formally adopted on February 25, 1964. According to this new policy, North Korea abandoned its traditional agriculture, with its rotational systems and organic fertilizing, for more capital-intensive, mechanized production, reduced labor, and heavy application of agrochemicals. Since economic sanctions denied North Korea the benefit of the West's modern technology and germplasm, the country began to develop hybrid seed varieties of its staple foods, rice and maize, which required large amounts of fertilizer and Rural electrification in North Korea took place relatively early in its national development, and the system was quite extensive. One goal of electrification was to fuel rural mechanization, with limited use ofgasoline/diesel fuel. Since North Korea lacked domestic petroleum reserves but had abundant coal deposits for operating thermoelectric power plants (as well as the capacity for hydroelectric generation because of its mountainous topography), it was more rational and practical to build a self-reliant economy based on domestic sources of electric power than on imported petroleum. North Korea reported full rural electrification, in which 100 percent of all rural households (both farm and nonfarm) had access to electricity, by 1974.29 As the mechanization program intensified, overall mechanization in agriculture increased significantly throughout the three decades from the 1960s to the 1980s. Specifically, tractor usage more than tripled, going from 12,500 tractors in 1960 to 75,000 (15 hp) in 1992.30 According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), "77 percent of all field-level agricultural production needs, including on-farm primary processing," had been mechanized by the late 1980s.31 A visible, successful mechanization program was important to North Korea for both practical and symbolic reasons. Most important, mechanization was needed to increase labor productivity in the face of labor shortages.
The Korean War left North Korea with a significantly reduced population, both from war casualties and from those who left the North for South Korea.
With the development of urban centers and an industrial sector, the demographic shift occurred in favor of industry, leaving rural areas with labor shortages. Symbolically, mechanization represented North Korea's progress toward modernization-a sign of development and a symbol of socialist achievement. Through the mechanization of fieldwork-plowing, transplanting, and transporting operations-the socialist state brought relief to peasants from backbreaking farm labor.
86Chong-Ae Yu North Korea's land utilization also gave impetus to mechanization. After rescaling the land through agrarian reforms, North Korea began expanding large-scale farming by taking full advantage ofmechanization. Farm mechanization, centered on tractor usage, was viewed as an efficient way to transform traditional farming into a modern system. The number of cooperatives fell from 16,000 in 1957 to fewer than 4,000 in 1958, while the average size of a cooperative's landholdings expanded to 450-500 hectares, each containing about 300 farm households.
Timely supply of water was an indispensable requirement in the "hybrid seed-fertilizer-water" scheme ofindustrial agriculture. North Korea's annual rainfall of 1,000-1,200 mm is concentrated in the period between May and September, half of it tending to occur in July and August. North Korea frequently suffered from both drought and floods, particularly in the rice-bowl area of the southwest plains, and the means to control the water therefore is vital. An additional contributing factor to the irrigation drive was the need for a supply of fresh water for the land expansion program in the western sea reclamation area.32 herbicides, and so forth. Of all agrochemical inputs in North Korea, petroleum-based fertilizers were the most significant of synthetic input. North Korea, however, had no petroleum deposits, and it was entirely dependent on petroleum imports for domestic fertilizer production as well as for agrochemicals.
The application ofchemical fertilizers grew rapidly between 1960 and 1984. North Korea reported the rate of application to be 160 kg per hectare in 1960 and over one metric ton per hectare in 1975.37 By the mid-1980s, North Korea claimed to have reached an all-time high oftwo tons per hectare38-one ofthe highest fertilizer-consumption use rates in the world.39 North Korea also had high application rates of pesticides, fungicides, and herbicides from domestic production and imports, mostly from China and Japan. Figure 2 provides a contextual glimpse into the growth trend in agro-inputs in each area.
In many ways, North Korea's industrial agriculture mirrored that of the U.S.-led Green Revolution; it emphasized a "hybrid seed-fertilizer-water" approach and focused on monocropping. To realize the Green Revolution varieties' full potentials, high doses of synthetic inputs and water were applied. Because of U.S. sanctions against North Korea beginning in 1950, North Korea was unable to take advantage of the Green Revolution's hybrid seeds. Accordingly, it embarked on revolutionizing its traditional seed varieties in the 1960s, and succeeded in developing many distinct disease-resistant, highyielding varieties (HYV) of rice and maize. North Korean agricultural scientists also developed varieties suited to limiting climatic conditions and high altitudes, along with a particular method of planting cold-bed seedlings.40 The development ofHYV for its staple foods has been critical to modern food production in North Korea.
The Interdependence of Agriculture, Energy, and Industry North Korea's industrial agriculture was possible in large part because of the development of its industrial sector, which supplied rural cooperatives and state farms with new technologies and agrochemical inputs. The state provided the material and technical assistance to undergird the industrialization process, and public investment in agriculture steadily increased from an average of 9 percent of state expenditures during the Three-Year Plan , to over 12 percent during the Five-Year Plan (1957-60) , and to nearly 20 percent during the Seven-Year Plan (1961-67) . Based on these resource developments in agriculture, North Korea was able to achieve major advances in food production and to meet its consumption needs until 1990. .£ 40,000 30,000 20,000 10,000 1956 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1992 , 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995,2000 1949, 1954, 1957, 1959, 1962, 1964, 1965, 1967, 1969, 1970, 1974, 1975, 1981 The precipitous decline of North Korea's economy in the 1990s-its GNP fell by one-half-and the realignment of global politics caused a crisis in the country's energy sector. The impressive pace ofthe economic development of the 1960s and 1970s had already slowed by the 1980s, prior to a sharp decline in the 1990s. 42 The realignment of the international balance of power-in 1 989, Eastern bloc countries started to crumble, and by 1991 they were all but gone, leaving North Korea bereft of trading partners-had aggravated difficulties in the North Korean economy.43 China stopped providing infrastructure support even before the Soviets did, and by 1993 China was reluctant to export oil to North Korea unless it was paid in hard currency at the time of transaction. North Korea found itself alone, simultaneously without key markets, financing, or sources of cheap energy supplies. The decline in import capacity had serious consequences for the energy sector, which in turn negatively affected industry and agriculture. By 1996, the total domestic production of fertilizer fell to less than 23 percent of its previous levels. The situation was similar for other categories of inputs and manufactured goods. Underlying the decrease in fertilizer production was the collapse of crude oil imports. Table 2 shows the decline in crude oil imports from 1989 to 1996. The data suggests a significant drop in crude oil imports between 1990 and 1991, and by 1996 the imports were down to 38 percent of 1989 levels, imposing severe stress not only on agricultural production, but also on the transportation and distribution of agricultural products.
Although oil accounts for only a small portion of North Korea's total primary energy consumption-about 6 percent-and was limited to nonsubstitutables such as motor gasoline, diesel, kerosene, and jet fuel,44 North Korea 92Chong-Ae Yu must import all the oil it consumes. For a country like North Korea, this dependency represented serious vulnerability. Concomitantly, coal production dropped to a level lower than that in the early 1980s, resulting in erratic supply delivery to all productive sectors and low overall utilization of installed machinery capacity; however, coal shortages affected none more than the energy sector. In 1990, North Korea's estimated per capita electricity generation was 2,500 KWh, on a par with South Korea,45 and its per capita energy use was 71 gigajoules per person (approximately 67.3 British thermal units (BTUs), or 2.4 tons coal equivalent/person), approximately 3.1 times that of China in the same year, and over half that of Japan.46 Since then, the levels of commercial energy supply and consumption in North Korea have dropped by more than one-half, and the crisis in the energy sector has pushed the economy further into a tailspin. North Korea's total electricity consumption in 2001 was still 58 percent of what it was in 1991.47 No increase occurred in the year-to-year rate of electricity consumption during the entire period from 1992 to 2001, except in 1992, when there was a 1 percent increase.48
In the mid-1990s the North Korean energy system took another decisive blow, this time from nature. A series of natural disasters-hailstorms in 1994, floods in 1995 and 1996, followed by a drought, and then tidal waves in 1997-severely damaged coal mines and hydroelectric plants. In addition to serious damage to crops and agricultural land, the energy infrastructure was irrevocably damaged.49 These damages have been difficult for North Korea to reverse, since rebuilding and reconstruction required heavy equipment and fuel. In 1990, thermal (coal-and oil-fired) and hydroelectric power plants produced approximately equal amounts of electricity, but after flood damages to large hydroelectric plants, thermal plants became the primary source ofpower generation.
These converging factors caused rapid contraction of the energy sector in the first half of the 1990s and an incremental decline in the latter half of the 1990s. Specifically, they resulted in (a) a continuing decline in the supply of crude oil; (b) continuing degradation of electricity infrastructures-power generation, electricity transmission, and distribution-and of industrial facilities; (c) damage to industrial electric motors from poor-quality electricity (unstable voltage and frequency); (d) continuing difficulties with the transport of all goods, especially coal; and (e) difficulties in coal production related to the lack of electricity. Most of all, this crisis in the energy sector had a detrimental impact on North Korea's highly industrialized agriculture, which was and continues to be based on its energy supply and fossil fuel products. Because North Korea's agriculture is closely linked to industry and the energy regime, the collapse of the latter created a domino effect in
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The Collapse of Irrigation and Farm Power
Irrigation Failure North Korea's irrigation system was energy-intensive. It contained large, complex irrigation networks, each composed of several sources: pumping stations, and reservoirs linked by canals, pipelines, and tunnels. Water pumping was required at various points in the system, and to pump water, the system required electricity and/or diesel fuel. Electricity was also needed to operate machine tools and other stationary equipment on farms.
The floods of 1995 and 1996 severely damaged North Korea's agricultural sector, especially its highly electrified irrigation networks and agricultural infrastructure. Although water was sourced from both surface supplies and ground aquifers, irrigation was mainly from surface water, and water for all but 300,000 hectares of 1 to 1.5 million hectares of irrigated area50 had to be pumped from rivers with considerable lifts using electricity and diesel fuel, after which it was distributed to crops by canals, often with further pumping, particularly for upland crops.
The bulk of the infrastructure-reservoirs, pump stations and ancillary equipment, weirs, water distribution, and drainage systems-was constructed during the 1960s and 1970s. A large proportion of the 32,000 pumps were installed more than thirty years ago.51 Consequently, most installations had reached the end oftheir economic life and were due for replacement. A significant portion ofthe irrigation system had deteriorated to the point ofunreliability because of broken-down pump sets, worn foot-valves, leaking distribution and steel delivery pipes, silted distribution systems, dysfunctional drainage systems, and so on. System losses had therefore reached a critical level and had a significant impact on yield. North Korea stated that six thousand pump sets should be replaced each year to bring the sector back to full operational efficiency.
With the energy sector in disarray, even if the agricultural sector were given priority in electricity distribution, the irrigation network does not have sufficient capacity to deliver power at the time when agricultural production demands it. Williams et al. argued that, given a national generating capacity of 4.7 GW with an actual online capacity of 3.1 GW in 1996 (after accounting for system losses in transmission and distribution), irrigation pumping demand represented "over one-third of all" of North Korea's generating 94Chong-Ae Yu capacity.52 Considering the deterioration of its energy infrastructure, it would be unrealistic to expect the energy sector to be able to increase its power generation on demand and redirect generated electricity supply to its agricultural sector at the peak time.
In summary, energy had been critical to the operation of North Korea's irrigation system, but the scarcity of electricity and fuel had made it impossible to guarantee timely supplies of water to the field. Natural disasters severely damaged canals and pumping stations-already in precarious condition-while pumping stations and steel pipes used in the system have suffered from a lack of spare parts and from poor maintenance. The breakdown of the irrigation system due to the lack of spare parts and electricity significantly contributed to the severe drop in North Korea's grain production.
Shortage ofFarm Power
The industrial base of North Korea enabled the country to motorize the agricultural sector, potentially providing 77 percent of all the farm power used in field-level production and on-farm primary processing for its two major crops, rice and maize.53 In contrast, under normal circumstances the agricultural population, through its labor force of 3.4 million, contributes only 9 percent of farm power, while draft animals contribute 14 percent to the total agricultural production power availability.
The high level of mechanization in agriculture meant that when North Korea could no longer support its industrial and agricultural mechanization base, agriculture faced serious constraints in production. Two constraints in particular stood out: a lack of fuel and electricity necessary to keep machinery and equipment running during the agricultural production process, and a lack of spare parts vital to keep agricultural machinery operating. An acute shortage of fuel, electricity, raw materials, consumable machine tool parts (e.g., tool steel), and other inputs depressed the manufacturing volume and the distribution of new replacement machinery and equipment to farms. There was no need to manufacture new tractors and machinery, even if it were possible, because farms could not supply enough fuel to their existing fleets of equipment. By the end of 1998, much agricultural machinery and equipment had become inoperable, either because it had reached the end of its service life or because of a lack of spare parts. Fuel to operate the machinery for critical mechanized operations had become exceedingly scarce because fuel allocations were reduced to perhaps only 20 percent of precrisis levels. 54 The combined effect of acute shortages of fuel and vital spare parts significantly altered the balance offarm power availability. At this time, North Korea had only 20 percent of the motorized capacity of farm machinery and equipment, deeply compromising the timely completion of field operations and leading to reduced yields and increased harvesting and postharvest losses.
The Collapse of Soil Fertility
Industrial agriculture requires a steady flow of inorganic chemical fertilizers to guarantee high yields. Prior to 1990, North Korea's fertilizer industry was vibrant, meeting most of its agricultural needs for the macronutrients N and P, but K55 was entirely imported because of a lack of usable potash reserve in the country. Fertilizer production requirements of feedstock, equipment, and spares were also imported from the Soviet Union and China prior to 1990; however, since then, there had been marked decline in the capacity to import needed inputs for fertilizer production. Some of the production units and plants were running at nominal capacity, plagued by numerous problems related to plant age, lack of resources for replacement of equipment and procurement of spare parts, and the nonavailability of petroleum-based feedstock and raw materials coupled with inefficient production technology. The shortage of electricity inevitably limited the productivity of fertilizer plants.
By 1996, North Korean fertilizer production had fallen to 130,000 tons, less than 17 percent of the national requirement, with essentially no imports available to supplement the consumption needs of its agricultural sector. FAO reported that the availability of fertilizer in 1998 was "only about 18 percent of the 1989 level" (FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission to the DPRK, November 12, 1998).
The Collapse of Seed Production
Along with the overall decline in other parts of the agricultural sector, seed production also collapsed in the mid-1990s. There were both quantity and quality problems associated with seed production. Quantitatively, seed production levels have been inadequate since the crisis began. Seed production in North Korea takes place at the county level and is undertaken by 240 state seed farms. During the precrisis period these farms produced 250,000 tons of seed: 101,000 tons of rice, 37,000 tons of maize, 23,000 tons of other cereals, 83,000 tons ofpotatoes, 400 tons of vegetables, and 50 tons of industrial crops, with other crops the remainder.56 Similar to other units in the agricultural sector, seed farms are also affected by the shortage of agro-inputs and the lack of an energy supply adequate for irrigating or for mobilizing machines and equipment. Consequently, seed threshing, cleaning, treatment, processing, storage, packaging, and distribution have been adversely affected, 96Chong-Ae Yu leading to high postproduction losses. Inadequate irrigation means lower crop yields. 57 The lack of inputs and equipment has substantially contributed to the decrease in available seed quantity, and this means that farmers have to postpone seed renewal ofnonhybrids for extended numbers of seasons and use lower-yielding retained seeds.
The quality of available seeds has been problematic for both hybrid-seed production and traditional renewal varieties. Hybridization of seeds is based on plant germplasm; however, the local germplasm suffers from a narrow genetic base, and traditional major varieties are in need of renewal after ten to fifteen years of use. North Korea's seed multiplication system is relatively less developed compared with international standards, and the quality control system is also considered to be in need of improvement. One ofthe issues affecting North Korea's ability to access international germplasm and technologies is U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea. As noted earlier, U.S. economic sanctions constrain North Korea from accessing many of the international agricultural research centers that receive U.S. funds.
In addition, cooperatives are using higher rates of seeding to mitigate seedquality problems and the effects of cold weather. In North Korea, plant densities are high, and the seed application rate is 125 kg per hectare for paddy and 45 kg per hectare for maize. However, the FAO reports that seed rates were increased to 150 kg per hectare for paddy and 60 kg per hectare for maize in 1998 because the supply of plastic sheets needed to cover seed beds during cold weather was limited.58 It has been noted that no more than 60 percent of the seed quantity actually used by cooperatives would be needed if it were of high quality. 59 In summary, seed production decreased because ofthe lack of agro-inputs; the hybrid and traditional seeds being produced suffer from low quality due to a narrow genetic base and nonrenewal. In turn, the lack of agro-inputs, such as plastic sheets, and poor quality seeds force cooperatives to use higher amounts of the shrinking supply of seeds.
The Environmental Factors
As noted earlier, in 1995 and 1996 North Korea was struck by torrential rains, tidal waves, and floods, which engulfed a large part of its agricultural lands. These catastrophes severely affected not only the year's agricultural production, but more important, damaged agricultural infrastructures such as the irrigation networks and transportation system,60 and pushed the country's capacity to produce food further into the margins. In 1995 North Korea recorded 23 inches ofrain in ten days, and in some areas as much as 18 inches of rain fell in a single day, bringing floods that were considered the worst in The Rise and Demise ofIndustrial Agriculture in North Korea97 1995331.010.718.2359.91,853.019 1996273.19.715.0297.71,853.016 Sources: Information extracted from draft report presented to the participants of Thematic Roundtable on "Agricultural Recovery and Environmental Protection (AREP) in DPR Korea," in Geneva, Switzerland, hosted by UNDP, May 28-29, 1998 . Information also originates from North Korea's Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee of DPR Korea, hosted by the United Nations Development Program (Palais des Nations, Geneva, May 28-29, 1998 ).
a century.61 Damage was extensive: 1.2 million hectares of agricultural lands were affected, 1.9 million tons of grains were lost, and the total cost of the flood damages reached $15 billion.62 1996 was no less severe; in fact, floods hit areas that had already been struck by the previous year's floods. The agricultural lands were hit especially hard since the bulk of the rain fell on the western plains, where the country's most fertile lands were located. Table 3 indicates the damages sustained in agricultural land in 1995 and 1996. Although official government reports differ on the exact toll that the 1995 and 1996 floods took on North Korea, foreign observers agreed that the disasters devastated North Korea's industrial and agricultural infrastructures. The epic floods were followed by severe droughts in 1997, 2000, and 2001 and complemented by cold winters,63 which exacerbated North Korea's reduced ability to produce food.
These natural disasters contributed to and hastened, rather than created, the collapse of agriculture in North Korea. Natural calamities took their devastating toll on North Korean agriculture because of the human-made ecological disaster that has been progressing ever since the modernization project accelerated in the 1960s. Preceding the natural disasters of the mid1990s, in 1991 the UNDP voiced its concern over North Korea's intensive use of chemicals, stating that such practices had led to land degradation vis-à-vis declining soil fertility, erosion and acidification, and water pollution.64
CONCLUSION
From the 1950s to the late 1980s, agriculture in North Korea underwent a drastic transformation to become both modern and industrial. North Korea abandoned traditional rotational systems and largely ended the practice of 98Chong-Ae Yu using organic fertilizers. From the outset, food-grain production was an energy-intensive undertaking, designed to succeed only when energy was readily available. Modern farming practices emphasized the use of inorganic fertilizer and other, usually petroleum-based, agrochemicals, without due consideration of the devastating impact such technological interventions would have on ecological relations. Paddy and maize fields were designed to take full advantage of the potential for mechanization, and irrigation systems depended heavily on electrically powered surface-water pumping. All land with any potential for rice and maize production was brought into cultivation without alternating crops or fallowing. Increasingly expensive and environmentally problematic tidelands-reclamation and drainage projects were undertaken to increase arable land. The modern system of intensive agriculture introduced in North Korea enabled continuous production, including the double-cropping of cereals.
For almost half a century, North Korea's agricultural sector was able to meet national needs for food grain despite the topographical disadvantages, a harsh climate, and a growing population that doubled in size from 10 million to 22 million. This seeming success, however, was based on the fragile balance of a complex set of social, ecological, political, and economic forces; if any one of these factors became unstable, the entire system would shatter. In the mid-1990s, North Korea's agriculture collapsed, and the ensuing food crisis became a large-scale famine.
Even before natural disasters brought devastation to North Korea, the country was experiencing a decline in production, due to both internal and external resource depletion. Industrial agriculture practices required increased inputs each time, as soils continued to deteriorate and plant diseases tended to proliferate and to wipe out the monoculture crops. At the same time, North Korea's agriculture industry required ever-increasing amounts ofhigh energy, especially petroleum products, and as a result of increasing chemical inputs the soil became acidified. In an effort to expand its arable land area, North Korea initiated reclamation projects and the terracing ofhills. These projects, in turn, contributed to further environmental degradation.
Although North Korea strove for a self-reliant economy, in reality its industrial agriculture was critically dependent on imports. Direct imports helped meet fertilizer needs and provided most other agro-chemicals as well as petroleum and fuel for farm machinery. Domestic industrial sector production in support of agriculture also relied on imports of raw materials, ranging from petroleum feedstock for the fertilizer industry to coke for the steel needed for machinery manufacturing. The demise of the socialist bloc and the Soviet Union left North Korea bereft of political allies and trading partners and led to the resultant agrarian crisis.
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At the same time, after several decades of extensive and intensive agricultural modernization, environmental degradation of production sites became visibly apparent, requiring more and more inputs just to maintain previous levels of productivity. North Korea's Green Revolution brought "ghost acreage,"65 on which a glass house of greater food self-sufficiency was built. To bring ghost acres into production, fossil fuel became as vital to North Korean agriculture as land and water resources.
Understanding the cause of the resulting agricultural collapse is important, not only because North Korea is one of the least understood countries in the world, but also because its industrialized agriculture is an example of what can happen to highly energy-dependent, modern agriculture. To begin with, North Korea has shown the world that modern agriculture is unsustainable-economically, politically, socially, and environmentally. It damages the land, draining water supplies and polluting the environment. And all this requires greater and greater fossil fuel inputs to pump irrigation water, to replace nutrients, to provide pest protection, to remediate the environment, and simply to maintain crop production levels. This necessary fossil fuel input crashes headlong into declining fossil fuel production. In the last century, oil dominated much of modern agriculture-as it has done in other sectors-and an eventual contraction of petroleum supplies will likely result in reduced food production elsewhere in the world, as we have seen in North Korea over the past seventeen years. 2.The North Korean Government has not released an official figure for the total number of famine-related deaths. Claims by foreign observers, especially in those in the United States, about the number of famine-related deaths vary widely, from 200,000 to 3.5 million. U.S. Congressional staffers Mark Kirk, Peter Brooks, and Maria Pica place the figure between 900,000 and 2.4 million from 1995-98 (see 7.FAO uses 1993 as the base year-there was a hailstorm in 1994-and calculated a rate of structural decline in agriculture. In the two-year period between 1993 and 1995, the production of paddy rice is assumed to have decreased by 10 percent and maize by 15 percent. This represents the annual rate plus a factor for an increasing rate of decline. See FAO, Special Report FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment, December 22, 1995, United Nations. 
